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Abstract 
Several theories have argued that democratic reform will lead to higher government spending. 
However, these theories have generally focused on expenditure on redistribution rather than 
expenditure on public goods. This paper argues that poorer citizens may desire relatively low levels of 
public goods provision and so democratization may lead to lower government expenditure on items 
such as public infrastructure. This hypothesis is tested using a new panel dataset of town council 
infrastructure spending and revenue in nineteenth-century Britain. An 1894 national reform 
implementing a system of “one-household-one-vote” and the secret ballot is used as the treatment 
event in a difference-in-difference analysis. The results show that democratic reform slowed the 
growth of town council spending on public goods, including water supply and other public 
infrastructure. Further analysis suggests that government spending was highest when the balance of 
political power was held by the middle class, rather than the poor. 
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1 Introduction
Many theories of democratization predict that extensions of the right to vote to the poor
will be associated with increases in government expenditure. Either poorer citizens demand
higher transfer payments since they bear a relatively low share of the taxation (Meltzer and
Richard, 1981; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2006; Boix, 2003) or an expanded electorate
incentivizes elites to offer higher expenditure on public goods (Lizzeri and Persico, 2004).
But while the mechanism through which spending increases varies, all these models share
the common assumption that government can engage in widespread redistribution.
Yet often, both historically and today, the primary role of government has been the
provision of infrastructure and public goods rather than redistribution. Many governments
have held limited ability to redistribute either because of legal restrictions or because the
apparatus of mass redistribution that we know today simply did not exist.1 In this paper I
argue that the distinction between types of government spending is important to understand
the effects of democratization, since the same theoretical arguments cannot be directly trans-
ferred from spending on redistribution to investment in infrastructure or spending on public
goods (Epple and Romano, 1996; Bursztyn, 2013). The demand for consumption of public
goods will depend on income, and so it is not clear that newly enfranchised poor citizens
would desire higher levels of government spending. Wealthier citizens may be willing to pay
higher taxes for public goods than the poor, since poorer individuals may prefer to spend
their income on more basic needs such as food. If wealthier citizens oppose taxes because of
their relatively high tax burden, public goods expenditure will be highest when the middle
class have the right to vote but the poor do not (Chapman, 2016b).
In this paper I test the argument that increasing the political power of the poor leads to
1Many governments spent nothing on social transfers in 1900, and even pioneering countries spent less
than 2% of national product on this type of redistribution (Lindert, 1994). Redistribution through taxation
was also limited, with the top rate of both inheritance taxes and income taxes low at the turn of the twentieth
century (Scheve and Stasavage, 2010, 2012; Ve´lez, 2014).
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increased opposition to government spending on public goods and infrastructure investment
using new data from town councils in nineteenth-century England and Wales. This context
offers an ideal setting for the empirical analysis since during this period government began to
provide a range of new urban infrastructure and public services, including clean water supply,
waste disposal, mass transit systems and electric lighting. As such I can identify the effects
of democratic reform on the provision of a range of public goods that are critical to economic
development. Further, as in most countries, at this time neither national or local government
was engaged in significant redistribution. National income taxes were low and affected only
a small proportion of the population (Scheve and Stasavage, 2010), while only 1% of national
product was spent on social transfers (Lindert, 1994). Town councils controlled spending on
urban infrastructure but not redistribution, and were limited to property taxation that fell
on both owners and renters.
To capture the effects of democratization I exploit differences in the governance of town
councils both across towns and over time. In particular, I take advantage of the fact that,
until 1894, towns that were incorporated were governed under a more democratic system
than other towns. Town councils in incorporated towns were elected under a secret ballot
and under a franchise where each head-of-household held a single vote. In unincorporated
towns, in contrast, there was no secret ballot in place, and citizens could receive up to 12
votes depending on the value of the property they owned and occupied.
If it was a shift in the political power of the poor that drove the growth of government
spending, we would expect that towns became much more likely to expand their spending
responsibilities after they became incorporated and shifted to the more representative gov-
ernance system. However, a simple investigation of the timing of investments by towns that
became incorporated before 1894 shows that this was not the case. Table I indicates that
most towns began spending on a range of public goods before they became incorporated.
Nearly all (91%) of the towns spent money on sewers before they were incorporated, while
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76% of towns were engaged in supplying water. Similarly, an equal or higher proportion of
towns started operating in burial, baths, gas supply and markets before incorporation than
afterward.
Table I: Towns incorporated between 1872 and 1894 were more likely to start
providing public goods and services before incorporation than afterwards.
Activity % of incorporated towns starting provision
Before
incorporation
After
incorporation
Did not start
before 1904
Burial 24% 24% 52%
Bath 35% 26% 39%
Gas 26% 13% 61%
Markets 43% 9% 48%
Sewers 91% 2% 7%
Water 76% 4% 20%
Note: Based on 46 towns incorporated between 1872 and 1894. Information for water and sewers is
drawn from the Local Taxation Returns, based on the first year of spending. Information for burial,
baths and markets is drawn from the 1903 Report of the Select Committee on Municipal Trading
(House of Lords, 1903).
To test the effects of democratic reform on government expenditure more rigorously,
I exploit an 1894 national reform that imposed the system of one-household-one-vote and
secret ballot on unincorporated towns. After this point in time, all towns were governed
under the system previously used in the incorporated towns. This reform is used as the
treatment event in a difference-in-difference analysis, where the “control” towns are those
incorporated before the reforms and the treatment group consists of the unincorporated
towns that were previously governed under the less democratic council system. I use an
identifying assumption of “parallel growths”, which implies that in the absence of treatment
the difference in the growth in spending per capita between unincorporated and incorporated
towns would have remained the same. My main dependent variable is the annual total
current expenditure per capita by local governments. This measure includes spending by
town councils on a wide range of public goods and services, with major items including
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water supply, street maintenance and cleaning, and sewer systems. In addition, the measure
also captures growth in infrastructure stock since it includes expenditure on repaying and
servicing the loans used to pay for infrastructure improvements.
My approach is complicated by the fact that incorporated and unincorporated towns
could potentially be very different since towns were not assigned at random to these groups.
I argue that incorporation status is plausibly exogenous since it was determined prior to
the period of analysis, and was often a reflection of royal charters received many centuries
previously.2 There is considerable overlap in the characteristics of the groups of towns,
including in town size, tax base and population density. The two groups are very similar in
terms of the proportion of the workforce engaged in agriculture, providing further evidence
that incorporation status was not a reflection of the industrial character of the towns. As
a further measure to ensure the comparability of the groups (and hence that the parallel
growths assumption is satisfied), I use a Coarsened Exact Matching procedure (Iacus et al.,
2012).
I then test whether the trend growth in government spending per capita in unincorpo-
rated and incorporated towns was different in the ten years prior to the reform (1884–1894)
compared to the ten years after the reform (1894–1903). The results show that the 1894
democratic reforms slowed the rate of growth in public expenditure in unincorporated towns.
Prior to the reforms, public goods spending in unincorporated towns kept pace with (if not
exceeded) spending in incorporated towns. In contrast, in the decade following the 1894
reform spending grew significantly more slowly. Similar effects are found for the growth of
tax revenue per capita, consistent with the argument that opposition to spending was driven
by a desire for greater consumption by the poor.
These findings indicate that, in contrast to many theoretical models, democratic reform
led to a reduction in the growth of government expenditure. However, they do not provide
2I exclude towns that became incorporated after 1884.
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any evidence of where impetus for greater public spending actually came from. To isolate
the mechanism through which expenditure was reduced, I use a proxy for the degree of
middle-class control of each town using the estimated distribution of servants in households
in each district. I define a household as “elite” if they contained at least one servant, and
then disaggregate between middle-class elites (those with one servant) and upper-class elites
(more than one servant)—definitions corresponding to contemporary definitions of social
class (Booth, 1903). I then estimate the ratio of middle-class to upper-class households in
each district.
I use this ratio to distinguish between councils that were controlled by the “middle class”
and those controlled by the “rich” before the 1894 reform. I find that the reforms had a
strong negative effect in middle-class-controlled towns but little evidence that they had any
effect in the upper-class-controlled towns. These results are robust to different definitions of
middle-class control, and to different specifications.
Finally, I explore in more detail the ways in which democratization reduced overall ex-
penditure. By separating between towns with or without various types of infrastructure
before the reforms I isolate whether spending slowed investment in new forms of infrastruc-
ture. I find evidence that after democratization towns became less likely to invest in forms
of infrastructure they had not previously invested in including, in particular, water supply.
This paper contributes to a large literature analyzing the expansion of the franchise on
the growth of government. Much of that literature has found evidence broadly consistent
with the hypothesis that democratic reform leads to larger government spending. Many of
these studies study expenditure on either social transfers (e.g., Lott and Kenny, 1999; Aidt
et al., 2006; Aidt and Dallal, 2008; Abrams and Settle, 1999; Lindert, 2004) or nationally-
funded education services (e.g., Stasavage, 2005; Brown and Hunter, 2004; Baum and Lake,
2003; Harding and Stasavage, 2014), rather than the infrastructure investments that are the
focus of this paper. The few studies that have tested the relationship between democratic
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reform expenditure on infrastructure spending, however, have not identified such a clear cut
effect of franchise extension on the provision of public goods. Husted and Kenny (1997) find
no effect of the expansion of the voting franchise on “non-welfare” services. Similarly, female
enfranchisement had no effect on investment in sanitation infrastructure between 1905 and
1930 (Miller, 2008).
In the nineteenth-century British context, Aidt et al. (2010) find evidence of a “retrench-
ment” effect, whereby the middle class opposed expenditure on public goods but the poor
support spending. However, using a much larger dataset Chapman (2016b) finds that public
goods expenditure was highest at a franchise of around 50% of the adult male population,
indicating that the poor opposed greater spending on public goods. By using the 1894 reform
as an exogenous change to council governance, this study is able to provide stronger causal
inference than these previous papers.
Beyond their significance for the political and economic development of Britain and other
wealthy democracies, these findings also have important implications for institutional design
in the developing world today. In these countries, the poorest citizens face income constraints
similar to the poor in nineteenth-century Britain, and there has been a trend towards the
sort of decentralization of spending authority that prevailed in Britain (Bonfiglioli, 2003).
Scholarly papers have investigated the role of increasing political participation and avoid-
ing elite capture on improving both the legitimacy and the representativeness of political
decisions (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Beath and Enikolopov, 2012; Olken, 2010). The
findings here suggest that widening participation to all citizens may lead to reductions in
spending on public goods.
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2 Theory and historical background
2.1 Theoretical overview and hypotheses
In this section I argue that the demand for government spending on public goods will be
highest amongst the middle class, drawing on the formal model presented in Chapman
(2016b). As a result democratic reform increasing the power of the poor at the expense of
the middle class will lead to lower expenditure on public goods.
Central to this argument is the fact that both the wealthy and the poor face a trade-
off between the level of public goods provision and their private consumption on items
such as food and shelter. Crucially, this is different from the trade-offs faced under the
common Meltzer-Richard framework, where government expenditure is used to implement
cash transfers; in that case the poor are always better off under higher levels of government
spending.
The relative size of these trade-offs will vary depending on income. Citizens with a low
income will benefit significantly from an additional unit of private consumption (that is, they
have a high marginal utility). To take an extreme case, an individual facing starvation would
prefer to spend additional income on food rather than sanitation. On the other hand, under
a proportional (or progressive) tax system, the poor will pay the least in tax (in absolute
terms). As a result the cost to them of additional spending on public goods is also lower.
These two competing effects lead to a predicted inverted-U-relationship between the level
of income and desired spending on public goods: the wealthy and the poor will desire lower
spending on public goods than the middle class. Extending this logic to understand the
effects of shifting political power towards the poor through democratic reform leads to the
following three hypotheses:
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Hypothesis I: Government expenditure on public goods and infrastructure will be
highest when government is controlled by the middle class.
Hypothesis IA: Transferring political power from the middle class to the poor will
lead to lower government spending on public goods.
Hypothesis IB: Transferring political power from the upper class to the poor will
have an ambiguous effect on spending. However, any negative effect on expendi-
ture will be less than that of a comparable transfer of power from the middle class
to the poor.
Since this relationship is driven by opposition to taxation, the model also leads to a
second testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis II: Transferring political power from the middle class to the poor will
lead to lower revenue from taxation but not from revenue sources that do not fall
on the poor.
2.2 Theoretical assumptions and historical background
Chapman (2016b) shows that these hypotheses hold if three major assumptions are met.
The British setting is valuable because, as I explain below, it closely meets all three criteria:
first, that all voters pay tax and that the tax structure cannot be changed following any
governance reform; second, that government revenue is spent on the provision of public
goods, rather than on redistribution (such as transfers) and, third, that the marginal value
of an additional unit of income grows rapidly as voters become very poor—intuitively, an
extra unit of food is extremely valuable to those near the starvation line.
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Taxation Town councils were responsible for funding their own expenditure, with limited fi-
nancial support from central government.3 Consequently towns’ ability to invest was “closely
circumscribed by local wealth and income” (Millward, 2004, p. 35). Capital investments had
to be funded out of debt; making the cost of borrowing a potential disincentive to greater
spending.
The primary source of revenue available to towns was local taxation, but councils faced
considerable limitations in the tax that could be raised. Taxes could only be raised on
“immovable” property, and as such towns were constrained by the “rateable value” of the
property in their district, defined according to the rental value of land and buildings in the
district.4 Most importantly however, these taxes fell on all citizens occupying houses—even
the poorest. Further, there was a direct connection between voters and payment of taxes
since those citizens who were unable to pay were disqualified from voting.
Town council spending on public goods Town councils, rather than the Westminster
parliament, were primarily responsible for expenditure on urban infrastructure in the second
half of the nineteenth century. After 1875 councils held considerable powers of spending over
infrastructure and sanitary expenditure. However, they remained constrained in their ability
to undertake other forms of expenditure. Councils controlled spending on infrastructure
that included (amongst other items) roads, sewers, water supply, baths, and gas supply (see
Appendix A for a more detailed breakdown of council spending).
Importantly, much of the expenditure on public goods was on items that were of clear
value to individuals of all income, since they contributed directly to public health improvements—
local government infrastructure investment was responsible for a large share of the decline
in mortality rates between 1861 and 1900 (Chapman, 2016a; Szreter, 2005). By contributing
3Appendix A contains more detailed discussion of the sources of support that were available from central
government.
4The details of the rating system are somewhat complex, since discounts could apply depending on both
the use of the land, and the way in which rent was paid. For further information see Offer (1981) and the
Final Report of the Royal Commission on Local Taxation, 1901 [Cd. 638]XXIV.413.
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to public health they were non-excludable; health reformers desired improved sanitation be-
cause it improved the overall disease environment of a town, rather than merely improving
their own health. At this time, it was very difficult for higher social classes to escape the
potential for disease created by poor sanitation since “many elements of sanitary condition—
water supply, drains, muck in the streets, odors, facilities for relieving oneself, complexion
and stature of the people—were truly public” (Hamlin, 1998, p.281). As a result health
investments benefited all social classes within a town, as evidenced by the fact that the life
expectancy of different social classes moved closely together after 1870 (Lizzeri and Persico,
2004).
Equally important to the theoretical argument are the types of expenditure councils
could not control. They did not hold responsibility for welfare expenditure (that is poor
relief) (Lizzeri and Persico, 2004) or expenditure on education.5
Value of additional consumption The final assumption relates to the relative importance
of an additional unit of private consumption to the very poorest. Given the benefits of
infrastructure such as sewers and water supply, it is important to understand the trade-offs
that the poor would have faced if they voted for higher taxes.6 At this point in history,
Britons were unlikely to face a choice between having enough food to survive and paying
higher taxes (particularly if they were able to actually pay taxes). However, they would
have faced trade-offs between the quality of food (such as the ability to consume meat and
vegetables) and the quality of housing they were able to purchase. Since both of these items
would contribute to health and life expectancy, it is plausible that the poor would place a
very high value on them.
5Welfare expenditure was controlled by Boards of Poor Law Guardians, who were elected separately on
a graduated franchise, with district boundaries which often differed substantially from those of the town
councils. Education spending was also determined separately by local School Boards.
6This discussion is derived from the analysis in Chapman (2016b).
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2.3 Democratic reforms to town councils
Each town council across England and Wales was elected by voters within each district,
under an electoral system determined at national level. However, the regulations under
which councils were elected varied across the country and over time. The key distinction in
our case is between the councils of incorporated towns—the so-called “municipal boroughs”—
and unincorporated towns. Incorporated towns were, throughout our period, governed by a
standardized system of locally elected councils.7 Councils were elected annually (with one-
third of councilors replaced each year) on the basis of one-household-one-vote under a secret
ballot, by an electorate consisting of all male heads of household subject to residence and
tax-paying requirements.
Unincorporated towns, on the other hand, were elected under a graduated franchise with
no secret ballot. Under this system voters could receive up to twelve votes depending on the
amount of property occupied and owned. Specifically, voters received 1 vote if the property
they occupied was rated for tax purposes at under £50 per annum, 2 votes if it was rated
between £50 and £100, continuing up to a maximum of six votes if the property exceeded
£250 per annum in rateable value. Similarly property owners would also have the right to
vote on the same basis and so those owning and occupying property could receive up to
twelve votes.
This distinction in electoral practice was maintained until the 1894 Local Government
Act, which standardized a system of one-household-one-vote, with the secret ballot, across
all towns. This Act is used as the treatment event in the Difference-in-Difference analysis
below.
7Specifically, they were governed under the basic framework established by the 1835 Municipal Corpora-
tions Act. It is these councils that are the focus of the discussion in Chapman (2016b), Aidt et al. (2010)
and Lizzeri and Persico (2004).
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2.4 Incorporated versus unincorporated towns
Before embarking on the difference-in-difference analysis it is crucial to understand the rea-
sons underlying the difference between incorporated and unincorporated towns. A town was
“incorporated” if it held a royal charter. Historically, these charters were granted to market
towns by monarchs dating back to the medieval ages. These charters provided a mark of sta-
tus to a town and granted additional rights that varied across towns (for instance, the right
to hold a court). The result was a set of incorporated towns at the turn of the nineteenth
century that were extremely varied both in their activities and their scope.
However, this situation was changed by the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act. This Act
standardized both the set of powers and the system of governance present in incorporated
towns. Furthermore, it created a procedure under which towns could apply for incorpo-
rated status allowing newer industrial towns a path to incorporation. The result of these
changes was that the set of incorporated towns was extremely varied, with most having
gained incorporation status for reasons orthogonal to the concerns of citizens in nineteenth-
century England. I analyze this variation and compare the characteristics of incorporated
and unincorporated towns in section 4.3.
The set of unincorporated towns includes all other towns defined as “urban sanitary dis-
tricts” under Public Health Acts. Crucially, these towns held the same powers and respon-
sibilities for infrastructure expenditure as the incorporated towns.8 However, incorporated
towns did have some additional responsibilities (particularly in terms of local policing and
justice), and consequently total expenditure per capita by incorporated town councils was
consistently higher.
8The powers attributed to the largest incorporated towns did change after 1890 and so these towns are
excluded from the empirical analysis as discussed in 4.3.
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3 Data
The data consists of two major parts: the financial data relating to annual town revenue and
expenditure; and demographic information drawn from decennial censuses. I discuss each in
turn below, and define some key variables used in the empirical analysis.
3.1 Financial data
3.1.1 Data sources and sample
The main part of the dataset is drawn from the annual accounts of all the town councils
(“urban sanitary districts”) responsible for sanitary expenditure between 1884 and 1903.
These accounts were reported by parliament in the Local Taxation Returns throughout this
period, and provide a detailed disaggregation of the sources of revenue and types of expen-
diture in each town.9 A panel dataset was constructed by hand-matching towns between
years to account for variations in place names over time.
For the purposes of this paper I include only towns that were reported in the accounts
between 1875 and 1911, in order to avoid any concerns regarding either changes in the
composition of the sample during the period, or complications associated with towns that
were beginning to spend for the first time and hence involved in a period of “catch up”. This
decision excludes two major groups of towns: newer industrial towns that became sanitary
authorities after 1875, and smaller towns that merged with expanding larger towns (and
hence stopped being independent sanitary authorities). Together, the excluded towns reflect
a relatively small part of the urban population of England and Wales.10
9The Local Taxation Returns form part of the Parliamentary Papers collection; a full list of the papers
used is available from the author upon request.
10The included towns represent 79% of the population of urban areas reported in the 1881 census, and
73% of the urban population reported in the 1891 census.
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3.1.2 Financial variables
Council expenditure
The main dependent variable is the annual total current expenditure per capita by town
councils. Current expenditure is identified as expenditure by councils “not out of loans” in
each year. I use current expenditure to avoid issues associated with volatile infrastructure
investment, which creates “spikes” in the expenditure data series. Current and investment
expenditure are separated in the annual accounts from 1884 onward, and hence this period
is used in the analysis.11
The current expenditure measure consists predominantly of expenditure on public goods
and services including streets, sewer systems, water supply, refuse collection and gas supply.
It also includes spending on servicing loans (interest and principal repayment), meaning that
the measure captures the ongoing cost of infrastructure expenditure even though the one-off
expenditures are not included.
Council revenue
I use four measures of revenue. Tax receipts are measured as the total revenue from property
taxes (the “rates”) for each town. Second, I include the revenue from property, including
both rents and property sales. The third revenue measure includes grants from both the
central government and county councils. Finally, I measure revenue from “Tolls” which
includes revenue from various fees (e.g. from markets), fines, and penalties.
Rateable value per capita
The dataset includes the rateable value—that is the value of the property tax base—for the
majority of years in the dataset. I linearly interpolate missing years.12
11Since we are interested in the amount of public goods and services provided, ideally we would adjust for
changes in the input prices local governments faced. However, existing price indices during the 1890s are
very volatile and hence add extreme fluctuations to the data (for instance, the Rousseaux price index shows
a 10% fall in prices between 1894 and 1895). Further, it not obvious which is the most appropriate price
series to use in this instance. More detailed discussion of this issue is contained in Appendix B.
12This information is missing for the year 1883 for incorporated towns; and for isolated years for other
towns. Incorporated towns sometimes reported a separate rateable value as municipal borough authorities
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3.2 Demographic data
Information regarding town population and the number of houses in each town is drawn
from the reports of the decennial census between 1851 and 1911. Information for the years
1851–1901 was collected directly for the purposes of this project. For the 1911 census I use
the parish-level data coded previously by Southall et al. (2004) and stored at the UK data
archive.
In addition to these demographic variables, I use information from the 1881 census to
identify the occupational structure of each town. A 100% sample of the 1881 census is
available from the North Atlantic Population Project (Minnesota Population Center, 2008;
Schu¨rer and Woollard, 2003). This dataset identifies the occupation, age, labor force status
and place of birth for each resident. I use this dataset to identify the proportion of the work
force in various occupations, including agriculture, textiles, domestic service, and mining.
Unfortunately, the census does not identify the current town of residence; rather it
identifies the parish and registration sub-district in which each individual lives. I therefore
match each town to registration sub-districts in the 1881 census. In some cases, the town
falls entirely within a single sub-district, in which case I assign the value in that sub-district
to that town. In others, towns were split across registration sub-district boundaries. In those
cases I estimate town characteristics by weighting according to the proportion of the town
in each of the registration sub-districts.
3.3 Measuring middle-class control
A key part of the paper is to distinguish between the effect of democratic reform in removing
control from the rich versus removing control from the middle class. Ideally I would identify
the proportion of voters receiving each weighting of votes in each town (from one to twelve),
and as sanitary authorities: I use the maximum of the two.
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but unfortunately this information is unavailable with few, if any, poll books from elections
of town councils available (Gibson and Rogers, 1994). Instead, I approximate the relative
power of the middle class using data from the 100% 1881 census discussed previously.
In particular, I identify the “elite” in each town as represented by the households with
one or more servants living in the household. I then distinguish the “middle-class elite”
as households with only one servant, and the “upper-class elite” as those with more than
one servant. The number of servants employed by a household was used as a contemporary
measure of class status: Charles Booth, for instance, defined the “Upper Middle Class” as
the “servant-keeping” class in his classic work on London poverty (Booth, 1903).
My measure of the relative power of the middle class is then given by:
Middle-class power =
#Middle-class households−#Upper-class households
#Elite households
=
#Households with 1 servant−#Households with >1 servant
#Households with >0 servants
This measure provides an indicator of the relative presence of the middle class within
the elite.13
Figure I displays the occupational breakdown of the households in each of these two
groups (where occupation is defined according to the occupation of the head of household).
We can see that, as expected, houses with servants were focused predominantly in agricultural
areas, fitting the classic image of a “manor house”. This is particularly true of households
with multiple servants, as we would expect if the measure is capturing these very wealthy
households. It is also notable that a large proportion of households in both groups fall
into the category of “no occupation”, which captures individuals receiving non-wage income,
13Since the number of votes held was graduated at several levels, I could alternatively measure the power
of the middle class as the proportion of servants (as a proxy for wealth) in households with one servant.
Similar results are obtained using this alternative indicator, as shown in Appendix B.
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such as from rent or dividends. We can also see that the group of households with more
than one servant is very concentrated within these five occupational categories—around
80% of households are covered, compared to under 65% of the one servant households.
This is likely to reflect the fact that a few successful households in other occupations were
sufficiently wealthy to pay for a single servant, but once we reach the higher echelons of
society occupations such as the professions represent a much higher proportion.
Figure I: Households with more than one servant comprised of more farming
and professional households.
Occupational categories are based on occupational order of head of household in the 1881
census for all households outside of London, using codings reported in Schu¨rer and Woollard
(2003). The category “no occupation (alternative income)” refers to the category entitled
“Persons without specified occupations” which was predominately comprised of those with
other sources of income (such as from rent or dividends).
As a further check that the measure is capturing the anticipated differences between
households I examine the occupations where having a servant is particularly common. Ta-
ble II presents the occupations with the highest proportion of households with 1 servant
(top panel) or more than 1 servant (bottom panel). Those with multiple servants are those
associated with either the gentry (Peers, MPs, local officials) or the professions (barristers
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and solicitors) whereas those with only one servant are related to the middle class (such as
bank service or brokers).
Table II: The majority of heads of household in the aristocracy and
professional occupations had multiple servants.
Occupation of household head % households with
1 servant >1 servant
Bank Service 46 33
Minister, Priest (not established or catholic) 45 11
Roman Catholic Priest 43 45
Chemist, Druggist 40 15
Bill Discounter, Finance Agent, Broker 38 20
Architect 38 25
Banker 10 84
Peer, MP etc 5 82
Clergymen (Established church) 21 72
Army Officer 18 67
Local/county Official 10 67
Barrister, Solicitor 21 66
Physician, Surgeon etc 27 64
Table indicates the proportion of heads of households in each occupational
category that had 1 or more than one servant. The top panel reports the
occupations with the highest share of households with one servant. The bot-
tom panel reports the occupations with the highest share of households with
more than one servant. Occupational categories are based on occupation of
head of household in the 1881 census for all households outside of London,
using occupational codings reported in Schu¨rer and Woollard (2003).
4 Empirical approach
4.1 Overview
I use the changes to the electoral system in unincorporated towns implemented by the 1894
Local Government Act to identify the causal effect of the shift of political power to the poor,
using a difference-in-difference approach. As national legislation this Act can be thought of
as exogenous to any individual town, particularly since it was motivated predominantly by
the effect on Poor Law Unions rather than sanitary authorities. The treatment group in this
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case is the non-incorporated towns while the control group is the incorporated towns that
already had a democratic system in place prior to the reforms.
The first stage of the analysis is to understand the effect of the reforms on spending and
taxation per capita in all towns. I then test whether democratization had different effects
in towns controlled by the upper class and those controlled by the middle class using the
measure defined in the previous section.
4.2 Specification
In contrast to a standard difference-in-difference approach, I analyze whether the reforms led
to a change in the trend growth between the treatment and control group. That is, rather
than making the usual “parallel trends” assumption, I assume “parallel growth” between
the two groups: in the absence of treatment, the difference in trend between the two groups
would have remained the same.14
This approach allows us to account for the fact that both the size and type of expenditure
that local governments were engaged in during this period were expanding rapidly over time,
meaning that part of the effect of democratic reform would be to change towns’ willingness
to take up new public goods. This would be reflected in a change in the growth rate of
expenditure, rather than a level shift as in a classic difference-in-difference approach. This is
especially true since many of the activities undertaken by these governments were governed
by previous commitments—for instance having built a water system, it would be hard to
“turn it off”.15
14See Mora and Reggio (2012) for a detailed discussion of the parallel growths assumption.
15Analysis in Appendix B, however, shows that the results hold if I instead estimate based on a change in
the level of expenditure.
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The main specifications are then of the form:
yi,t =α + β1Unincorporated+ β2time+ β2time ∗ Unincorporated
+ β3time ∗ post1894 + β4time ∗ Unincorporated ∗ post1894 + β5Xi,t
where i indexes towns and t indexes years. The dependent variables (denoted yi,t) in the
main specifications are either annual current expenditure per capita or annual tax receipts
per capita. Unincorporated is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the town was not incorporated
at the beginning of the period (i.e. 1884)—and hence was affected by the 1894 reforms. time
is a linear time trend. This specification allows for differences in the rate of growth between
incorporated and unincorporated towns both before and after the 1894 reforms.
The key variable of interest is then β4 which identifies whether the trend change in
expenditure in unincorporated (and hence undemocratic) towns changed relative to that in
incorporated (democratic) towns after the reforms. If, as predicted by classic median-voter
models, the shift in power to the middle class led to greater expenditure, we would expect
β4 > 0. If, on the other hand, the poor opposed expenditure because of their desire for
greater consumption, then β4 < 0.
As discussed below (and displayed in Table III) there are large observable differences
in the characteristics of the treatment and control group—particularly in terms of town
size and tax base. This is a potential concern since these characteristics may be associated
with differences in both the cost of provision and level of demand for public goods, and
so may affect the rate of uptake of new public goods. Large, densely populated cities are
more likely to suffer from disease since cramped living conditions lend themselves to easy
spread of disease. Further, the demand for sanitary infrastructure is driven, partly, by the
understanding of their importance to public health, which may be dependent on the size of
sanitary movement within a city. Aside from sanitary concerns, there may be other sources of
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demand for some of the public goods examined here that are also correlated with these town
characteristics. Water supply, for instance, was in demand for industrial as well as consumer
needs (Hassan, 1985). We might also think that sewer systems (particularly drainage) might
be in greater demand in more agricultural areas. On the cost side of the analysis, we must
consider the fact that there may be important economies of scale in the provision of many of
these sanitary investments. Larger cities may have had lower costs of provision per capita;
since the fixed costs of (for instance) a water plant would be spread over a wider area.
Similarly, there may be cost savings associated with densely populated towns, since pipes
and streets need to be laid over a smaller area. Higher numbers of people per house mean
that several people can be reached for the cost of a single connection to a water main.
To address these issues I include as control variables measures of population, population
growth, urban crowding, and population density. I also include measures of occupational
structure of the town, by measuring the percentage of the workforce in the service, agricul-
tural, white collar (professional/commercial occupations), textiles and minerals sectors. In
addition, I include a measure of the proportion of the population foreign born, to account
for any effect of ethnic heterogeneity on the demand for public goods (Alesina et al., 1999).
To allow for a non-linear relationship, each variable is split into “bins” which are entered
as a series of dummy variables. In some specifications I also include town fixed effects to
capture other time invariant, but unobserved, features that may affect spending (for instance
distance to a river may affect spending on water supply). Finally, I include variables that
may affect town councils’ spending capacity, including the town tax base (“rateable value”),
receipts from property, and receipts from government grants. Descriptive statistics of the
main variables used in the regressions are presented in Appendix Table IX.
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4.3 Identifying assumptions and sample balance in observable char-
acteristics
The identifying assumption underlying this approach is that the difference in the growth
of spending between the two groups of towns would have been constant in the absence
of the treatment (i.e. the 1894 reform). Unfortunately, we do not have a clean natural
experiment where towns were allocated into different groups at random: towns did not
select into incorporation status arbitrarily. However, this does not invalidate the identifying
assumption as long as the factors affecting selection are unrelated to the spending decisions
in the 1880s and 1890s.
As explained in Section 2, most incorporated towns became incorporated as a result of
royal decisions that, in some cases, stretched back to the medieval ages. These towns were
extremely heterogeneous and, I argue, had become incorporated for a set of reasons that
had nothing to do with their situation in 1884 (when our analysis starts). Evidence for this
claim is provided by the how varied these towns were—ranging from very large industrial
towns (such as Liverpool) to extremely small rural towns.
Figure II illustrates the heterogeneity of town characteristics. Each panel in the figure
displays the distribution of a different town characteristic for incorporated and unincorpo-
rated towns separately. The top two panels indicate that although the incorporated group
(the solid blue line) included a higher proportion of both large and very dense towns, there is
also a set of incorporated towns that were similar in both size and density to unincorporated
towns (note that the population figure excludes 31 incorporated towns that were larger than
80,000 in population).
Importantly, the bottom left panel shows that there is very little difference between
incorporated and unincorporated towns in terms of the percentage of workforce employed
in agriculture. This supports the claim that incorporation status was not a reflection of the
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industrial status of the town. Finally, the last panel indicates that there was also extensive
overlap in the size of the tax base across the two groups.
Figure II: Extensive overlap in the characteristics of incorporated and
unincorporated towns.
0
.0
00
05
.0
00
1
.0
00
15
K
er
ne
l d
en
si
ty
0 20000 40000 60000 80000
1891 population (<80000)
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
K
er
ne
l d
en
si
ty
0 10 20 30 40 50
1891 population density (<50 people per acre)
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
K
er
ne
l d
en
si
ty
0 20 40 60
1881 % workforce in agriculture
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
K
er
ne
l d
en
si
ty
0 2 4 6 8 10
1891 tax base per capita (<£10)
Incorporated Unincorporated
Note: Including 258 incorporated towns and 433 unincorporated towns. For
display purposes the density distributions are truncated, with the number
of towns excluded as follows. Population >80,000: 31 incorporated, 0 in-
corporated. Population density >50 per acre: 3 incorporated, 2 unincorpo-
rated. Rateable value per capita >10: 0 incorporated, 5 unincorporated.
However, there is a concern that some towns became incorporated during the period of
our analysis, leading to an expansion of their spending powers and responsibilities—clearly
affecting the trend in spending. Further, the powers of the largest towns were expanded in
1890.16 Since this change occurred during the period of our analysis and applied only to
previously incorporated towns, it directly violates the assumption of parallel growths. As
16Specifically, the largest towns became County Boroughs in 1890, which involved gaining control of
different items of spending (notably education and funding of roads elsewhere).
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such I exclude these towns from the sample.
Another potential issue is that even though selection into incorporation status was not
directly driven by a desire for greater town spending, it may be correlated with other factors
that affect spending decisions. As demonstrated by the top panel of Table III, there are
large differences in the observable characteristics of the incorporated and the unincorporated
towns. Incorporated towns tended to be larger on average, and included all the very large
towns. They also tended to be wealthier and denser. Although these differences are mitigated
by removing those towns that changed governance structure after 1883, there remain clear
disparities between the two groups (second panel).
The differences between the two groups are of concern only if they violate the parallel
growths assumption. Even if wealthier and larger towns tend to grow faster, this is not an
issue as long as the difference in growth rates remains constant over time. Although this
assumption is plausible, there are some conceptual reasons that could lead to differences in
growth rates between different types of towns. For example, it could be violated if there are
types of towns in the incorporated group that are not represented at all in the unincorporated
group, since these towns may implement new technologies at a very different rate.
To address these concerns, I improve the sample balance of town characteristics further
by constructing a matched sample using “Coarsened Exact Matching” (CEM) (Iacus et al.,
2012). Specifically, towns are only included in the analysis if there is a match on four
characteristics: population (in three categories “<1000”, “1000-20000” or “>20000”), per
capita rateable value and the 1891 population density (each in 4 quantiles) and the estimated
proportion of the workforce engaged in service in 1881 (in two quantiles).17
This procedure reduced the sample significantly; removing 40 incorporated towns, and
98 other towns as shown in the bottom panel of Table III. The differences between the
groups of towns in terms of both population and population density were significantly re-
17The exact characteristics or strata included in the match are not critical to the results.
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Table III: Sub-samples are more similar after matching exercise, but still
significant differences in average population and agriculture.
Unincorporated Incorporated Diff.
N Mean N Mean
Whole sample
1891 population 433 6358 258 39204 -32846
Urban crowding 433 4.92 258 5.02 -0.10
Population growth 433 1.0 258 0.9 0.1
Population density 433 4.89 258 13.41 -8.53
Occupation Service (%) 433 16 258 18 -2
Occupation Agriculture (%) 433 14 258 11 3
Occupation Textile (%) 433 13 258 9 4
Occupation Minerals (%) 433 16 258 9 7
Occupation White Collar (%)) 433 5 258 6 -1
Rateable Value p.c. 433 4.08 258 4.77 -0.68
Excluding towns changing governance
1891 population 418 5651 160 13238 -7587
Urban crowding 418 4.91 160 4.85 0.07
Population growth 418 0.9 160 0.6 0.4
Population density 418 4.54 160 10.21 -5.68
Occupation Service (%) 418 16 160 19 -3
Occupation Agriculture (%) 418 14 160 13 1
Occupation Textile (%) 418 13 160 8 6
Occupation Minerals (%) 418 16 160 8 8
Occupation White Collar (%)) 418 5 160 6 -1
Rateable Value p.c. 418 4.02 160 4.60 -0.58
After matching
1891 population 321 6198 120 7963 -1765
Urban crowding 321 4.97 120 4.78 0.20
Population growth 321 1.1 120 0.5 0.6
Population density 321 5.47 120 8.69 -3.22
Occupation Service (%) 321 16 120 20 -4
Occupation Agriculture (%) 321 12 120 16 -4
Occupation Textile (%) 321 13 120 4 9
Occupation Minerals (%) 321 17 120 7 10
Occupation White Collar (%)) 321 5 120 6 -1
Rateable Value p.c. 321 4.06 120 4.56 -0.50
“Excluding towns changing governance” is the sample excluding towns incorpo-
rated that incorporated after 1883, or that became County Boroughs. “After
matching” refers to the sample created based on coarsened exact matching on
1891 population, population density, rateable value per capita and 1881 estimated
percentage of servants in the workforce.
duced, as a result of excluding several densely populated large (a population of above 20,000)
incorporated towns.
While the improvement in observable balance is reassuring, the key issue is whether the
matching process improves the validity of the “parallel growths” assumption. Figure III plots
the average level of current expenditure per capita before and after the match (excluding
towns that changed governance after 1883 in both cases). The top panel displays only years
before the reform—to aid visibility—while the bottom panel plots the data for the entire
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period (with the red vertical line representing the date of the 1894 Local Government Act).
We can see that incorporated towns spent consistently more than unincorporated towns
across the period—as expected, given both the additional responsibilities they held and the
differences in observable characteristics. The difference is lower after the matching exercise
as a consequence of the largest towns being excluded.
The figure also shows some evidence of divergence in the growth trend of the different
groups when considering the whole sample. After 1889, in particular, there is some indication
that spending in incorporated towns began to grow at a faster rate than in unincorporated
towns. In the matched sample, on the other hand, there is no evidence of this effect. Apart
from a small dip in 1890, the gap between the two groups remains constant across this period.
In this group, then, the parallel trends (and hence parallel growths) assumption is satisfied.
This finding is supported further in the regression results.
5 Results
The first set of results is presented in Table IV. The variable of interest is Time *Unincor-
porated* Post1894, which identifies the relative change in the trend growth of spending in
those towns with councils reformed in 1894. All dependent variables are standardized and
so the size of this coefficient represents the effect in terms of a one standard deviation in per
capita current expenditure. Specification (1) includes only the time trends and a dummy
variable identifying unincorporated status as independent variables. In specifications (2)-(4)
I include the control variables for time-varying demographic characteristics, 1881 occupa-
tional structure, and town revenue sources respectively. In specification (5) I add town fixed
effects.18 Finally, in specification (6) I restrict the sample to the years after 1889—as a
further check that the result is not driven by changes in the trend growth between 1883 and
18Specifications including fixed effects do not include occupational characteristics since our measure of
these variables is fixed at a single point in time.
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Figure III: Similar pre-trends between incorporated and non-incorporated
towns in matched sample.
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Note: Estimates represent sample mean for each group. Upper panel is identical to the
lower panel, but focused on the years pre-reform to assist with inspection of the trends.
1890.
All specifications show consistent evidence that the 1894 reforms led to a reduction in
the growth rate of government expenditure per capita. The coefficient on Time* Unincor-
porated* Post1894 is negative and statistically significant in all specifications. As expected
from Figure III, non-incorporated towns had lower levels of spending (the coefficient on Un-
incorporated town dummy is significant). Also as expected, other sources of town revenue
are positively correlated with spending.
The table also provides reassurance that our results are not a spurious result of pre-
existing divergences in trend growth between the two groups. In four of the six specifications
the coefficient on Time*Unincorporated is statistically indistinguishable from zero, including
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when the sample is restricted to the period after 1889. Further, in the other two cases the
coefficient is positive, indicating that before 1894 spending in unincorporated towns was, if
anything, growing at a faster rate than in the democratically governed incorporated towns.
Table IV: Democratic reform led to a reduction in the trend growth in town
council expenditure.
DV = Current expenditure p.c. (standardized)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unincorporated -0.576*** -0.613*** -0.297*** -0.218***
(0.079) (0.080) (0.079) (0.079)
Time 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.000 0.002 0.014*** 0.025***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009)
Time*Unincorporated 0.003 0.003 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.007 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010)
Time*Post1894 0.068*** 0.071*** 0.087*** 0.085*** 0.077*** 0.064***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011)
Time*Unincorporated*Post1894 -0.024** -0.025** -0.053*** -0.048*** -0.034*** -0.032**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014)
Tax base p.c. 0.372*** 0.311*** 0.155** 0.139*
(0.047) (0.052) (0.066) (0.084)
Property receipts p.c. 0.051 0.048 0.009 0.004
(0.043) (0.041) (0.010) (0.006)
Grants p.c. 0.255*** 0.246*** 0.186*** 0.161***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.017) (0.022)
Pop controls N Y Y Y Y Y
Occ controls N N N Y N N
Town FE N N N N Y Y
Obs. 8794 8794 8794 8794 8794 6158
Rsq 0.22 0.27 0.48 0.49 0.51 0.46
Years All All All All All > 1889
The effect of democratic reform is identified by the interaction between unincorporated, time and the post 1894 dummy
variable. Population controls variables include (in 4 quantile bins) population, urban crowding, population growth,
and population density. Occupation controls includes estimates of the percentage of the 1881 workforce in textiles,
minerals, agriculture, service and commercial/professional, as well as the proportion of the population foreign born.
All financial variables are standardized in terms of their standard deviation. “All years” includes 1884–1903. Stan-
dard errors are clustered by town and displayed in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Appendix B includes tests of the robustness of these results to different specifications.
In particular, I re-estimate these six specifications by testing for a level change in the ex-
penditure per capita (rather than a change in the time trend). I find that the results are
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consistently negative, and statistically significant when the lagged level of expenditure per
capita is included. Further, I include specifications with the change (rather than the level)
of expenditure per capita as the dependent variable and find similar results. As such, there
is clear evidence that the growth of expenditure in unincorporated towns was lower after the
1894 reforms.
Effects of democratic reform on revenue
These results show a clear effect of democratic reform on town expenditure. Was this driven
by concerns over taxation? To test whether this was the case, I estimate whether the
reduction in town expenditure was associated with lower tax revenue. If lower town spending
was driven by the poor’s desire for greater personal consumption then tax revenue would
also be reduced by the reforms. However, we would not expect as strong an effect on other
sources of revenue, which are are more likely to fall on wealthier citizens.
To test this hypothesis, in Table V I assess whether the reforms led to a reduction in
trend growth in receipts from taxes and receipts from tolls. This latter category, which
included in particular receipts from markets and other tolls, would have been less targeted
at the very poorest households. I also include a measure of property receipts—which should
also be largely unaffected by the reforms since they were largely dependent on pre-existing
holdings of land.19 The results show that the growth in tax revenue slowed after the reforms,
but there is no evidence of any effect on the other revenue categories.
Democratization in rich versus middle-class controlled towns
These findings suggest that overall the democratic reforms of 1894 slowed the growth of town
spending. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the poor opposed spending relative to
wealthier individuals. However, it does not distinguish between shifts from control by the
upper class to the poor as opposed to shifting control from the middle class to the poor. To
19It is for this reason that receipts from property is also included as a control variable in the regressions
above.
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Table V: Democratic reform led to reduction in tax receipts but not other
forms of revenue
DV=Tax receipts p.c. DV=Tolls receipts p.c. DV=Property receipts p.c.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unincorporated -0.068 -0.791*** -0.462***
(0.075) (0.130) (0.064)
Time -0.006 0.009* 0.023** 0.012 -0.014* -0.005
(0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005)
Time*Unincorporated 0.023*** 0.010* -0.001 0.009 0.012* 0.010**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005)
Time*Post1894 0.100*** 0.087*** -0.061*** -0.050*** 0.045 0.039
(0.010) (0.009) (0.019) (0.018) (0.031) (0.027)
Time*Unincorporated*Post1894 -0.052*** -0.028** 0.016 0.003 -0.042 -0.039
(0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.020) (0.030) (0.026)
Population controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Occupation controls Y N Y N Y N
Wealth controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Town FE N Y N Y N Y
Obs. 8794 8794 8794 8794 8794 8794
Rsq 0.55 0.41 0.25 0.03 0.08 0.00
Estimated using annual data 1884–1903. “Population controls” include (in quantile bins) population, urban
crowding, population growth, and population density. “Occupation controls” include (in quantile bins) the
percentage of the 1881 workforce in textiles, minerals, agriculture, service and commercial/professional, as well
as the proportion of the population foreign born. “Wealth controls” include per capita rateable value, central
government grants and property revenue. Standard errors are clustered by town and displayed in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
address this issue I split the sample into two groups according to the median level of our
middle-class power measure defined in Section 3.3, and estimate the same specifications as
above.
The results in Table VI show very distinct effects across the two groups of towns. In
towns with a relatively weak middle class—specifications (1)-(3)—there is little evidence
that the 1894 reforms decreased town expenditure. While the coefficients are negative in
specifications (2) and (3) the estimated effect is statistically insignificant once town fixed
effects are included. In the towns dominated by the middle class, in contrast, the reforms
had large and statistically significant effects. Each year post reform, town spending grew by
approximately 0.06 standard deviations less than it would have done in the absence of any
reform, a cumulative reduction in spending of more than half a standard deviation over the
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period. Note also that, as before, there is no evidence that these towns were growing at a
slower rate before the 1894 reforms.
Table VI: Strong evidence for reduction in expenditure in middle-class
dominated towns, but not in those dominated by the upper class.
Upper-class dominated Middle-class dominated
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unincorporated -0.440*** -0.236** -0.626*** -0.157
(0.112) (0.094) (0.112) (0.127)
Time 0.032*** 0.001 0.014*** 0.024*** 0.001 0.013*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007)
Time*Unincorporated 0.005 0.018*** 0.010* 0.004 0.014 0.005
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Time*Post1894 0.051*** 0.075*** 0.064*** 0.097*** 0.110*** 0.103***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014)
Time*Unincorporated*Post1894 0.004 -0.034** -0.016 -0.063*** -0.076*** -0.063***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014)
Population controls N Y Y N Y Y
Occupation controls N Y N N Y N
Wealth controls N Y Y N Y Y
Town FE N N Y N N Y
Obs. 4392 4392 4392 4402 4402 4402
Rsq 0.18 0.49 0.52 0.29 0.51 0.55
Estimated using annual data 1884–1903. Middle-class dominated and upper-class dominated towns are de-
fined by splitting the towns according to the median of the middle-class power measure defined in Section 3.3.
“Population controls” include (in quantile bins) population, urban crowding, population growth, and popula-
tion density. “Occupation controls” include (in quantile bins) the percentage of the 1881 workforce in textiles,
minerals, agriculture, service and commercial/professional, as well as the proportion of the population foreign
born. “Wealth controls” include per capita rateable value, central government grants and property revenue.
Standard errors are clustered by town and displayed in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Items of spending affected
Which items of expenditure were affected by these democratic reforms? I have focused on
a slowing of growth in expenditure on the basis that town councils would be less willing to
invest in new infrastructure after democratic reform. To analyze this argument further, I re-
estimate specification (6) from Table VI, using individual items of expenditure as dependent
variables.20 The estimated changes in trend (and associated 95% confidence intervals) are
displayed in Figure IV.
20Only the middle-class controlled towns are included in these specifications in order to highlight the effects
clearly. However, the results are qualitatively the same when using the whole sample.
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Figure IV: Estimated effects of democratic reform varied across different types
of expenditure, with the strongest effects on hospitals and newer forms of
infrastructure.
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Note: Estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from re-estimating specification
(6) of Table VI with dependent variable equal to expenditure on each item.
With the exception of sewer systems, all the point estimates are negative, but most are
not statistically distinguishable from zero. The main exceptions are hospitals (a rare type
of expenditure that would include little infrastructure investment and that comprised only
a small part of the municipal budget), gas supply and other public works (which included
newer items such as tramways and electric lighting).
Why might the evidence be weak for many of these individual items? One possibility is
simply that the data is too noisy to isolate effects on individual spending items; for instance,
towns may not have properly distinguished between spending on water supply as opposed
to sewer systems. A deeper explanation, however, could be that infrastructure items such
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as water supply and sewers were already in place in many towns, and thus that there was
less possibility to observe growth in these items. To assess this hypothesis, I first compare
whether towns were more likely to have invested in either water supply or sewer systems in
1884. To identify whether towns had invested I identify whether towns had loans outstanding
in the relevant category in 1884 (the first year for which data was available). Table VII then
presents logit regressions of this binary variable against town characteristics.
The results show that unincorporated towns were significantly more likely than incorpo-
rated towns to have invested in both sewer systems and in water supply in 1884. In the case
of water supply this effect was limited to towns where the middle class was more dominant,
whereas in the case of sewer systems there is no evidence of any difference between towns
dominated by the upper class as opposed to the middle class.
One difficulty with this approach is that it does not account for the fact that towns may
have differing needs for these investments. In some cases, for instance, towns may have been
able to purchase water from other nearby towns. The control variables should account for
much of this difference. However, as a further check, in specifications (2) and (4) I limit the
analysis to towns that had invested in the relevant infrastructure by 1904, indicating that
they did require this infrastructure. The results are similar, indicating that unincorporated
towns invested earlier in these infrastructure items.
To further understand how democratic reform affected the pattern of infrastructure de-
velopment, I examine whether the 1894 reforms had differential effects depending on the
level of infrastructure that towns had previously invested in. To do this, I carry out a simple
fixed effects regression of the level of loans outstanding per capita in towns ten years before
the reforms (1884), one year before the reforms (1894) and the last period of our analysis
(1903). I then include two dummy variables identifying towns that were unincorporated in
1894 and in 1903 respectively.
Table VIII presents the results. In specifications (1) and (2) I analyze water supply
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Table VII: Unincorporated towns were more likely to have invested in sewer
systems and water supply in 1884.
Average marginal effects from logit regression of investment in:
Sewers Water
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All towns Invested by
1904
All towns Invested by
1904
Unincorporated 0.221*** 0.254*** -0.130* -0.030
(0.071) (0.077) (0.074) (0.091)
Middle-class dominated 0.023 0.016 -0.204** -0.225*
(0.093) (0.107) (0.097) (0.123)
Unincorporated*Middle-class dominated -0.018 -0.035 0.288*** 0.379***
(0.108) (0.121) (0.106) (0.143)
Population controls Y Y Y Y
Occupation controls Y Y Y Y
Wealth controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 438.00 344.00 438.00 235.00
Pseudo R-sq 0.15 0.13 0.09 0.17
Table VII presents average marginal effects from logit regression with dependent variable identifying whether
a town had invested in sewer systems or water supply by 1884. Investments are identified by having out-
standing loans relating to the relevant type of infrastructure. Middle-class dominated and upper-class dom-
inated towns are defined by splitting the towns according to the median of the middle-class power measure
defined in Section 3.3. “Population controls” include (in quantile bins) population, urban crowding, popula-
tion growth, and population density. “Occupation controls” include (in quantile bins) the percentage of the
1881 workforce in textiles, minerals, agriculture, service and commercial/professional, as well as the propor-
tion of the population foreign born. “Wealth controls” include per capita rateable value, central government
grants, and property revenue as well as the percentage of households with no servants. Standard errors are
clustered by town and displayed in parentheses. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
spending, separating between towns that had government investment in water supply in
1884 and those that did not. We can see that there is a negative effect of the reforms in
towns without investment in supplying water in 1884 but not in those that already had
a water supply. A similar pattern is seen in the case of sewers in columns (3) and (4),
although the coefficient is no longer statistically significant. This may reflect the fact many
towns already had access to this infrastructure or that alternatives not requiring investment
in infrastructure were available (refuse collection, for example). Importantly, in all cases,
the dummy variable for being unincorporated in 1894 is statistically insignificant, indicating
no evidence of a negative effect before the 1894 reforms.
In columns (5)-(8) I analyze “other public works”: this latter category captures public
goods that tended to be implemented after water supply, including gas supply, tramways
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and electric lighting.21 In specifications (5) and (6) I estimate the same regressions as in
previous columns. Reflecting the heterogeneous composition of this category, here we see
a negative relationship regardless of whether towns already had loans outstanding in this
category.
Table VIII: Democratic reform slowed expansion to new types of infrastructure.
DV=Loans outstanding p.c. (standardized)
Water Sewers Other PW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Unincorporated*1894 -0.073 0.036 -0.191 -0.107 -0.285 0.131 -0.095 -0.362
(0.104) (0.112) (0.254) (0.147) (0.219) (0.122) (0.256) (0.422)
Unincorporated*1903 -0.358** -0.228 -0.338 -0.077 -1.976* -0.842** 0.150 -5.744***
(0.168) (0.240) (0.282) (0.247) (1.022) (0.342) (0.245) (0.555)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Town FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Population controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Occupation controls N N N Y N N N N
Wealth controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sample No water
1884
Had
Water
1884
No sewers
1884
Had
Sewers
1884
No Other
PW 1884
Had
Other
PW 1884
No Other
PW 1884;
no water
1894
No Other
PW 1884;
had water
1894
Obs. 401 259 311 349 302 358 182 120
No towns 134 87 104 117 101 120 61 40
Estimated using data for 1884, 1894 and 1903, using middle-class dominated towns (as in specifications (4)–(6)
of Table VI). “Other PW” includes gas supply, trams, electric lighting and “other”, which could be thought of
“more advanced” than water supply. “Population controls” include (in quantile bins) population, urban crowd-
ing, population growth, and population density. “Wealth controls” include per capita rateable value, central gov-
ernment grants and property revenue. Standard errors are clustered at town level and presented in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Columns (7) and (8) then distinguish between towns that had water supply in 1894 and
those that did not. By doing so I am testing whether in fact an “ordering” of investment
was at work, whereby towns would first invest in water, and then move onto more advanced
public goods. We can see that this was the case: democratization reduced spending on these
other public goods only in towns which already had water supply in 1894. This supports the
hypothesis that, after democratic reforms, the unincorporated towns became less willing to
invest in the next “stage” of their infrastructure development.
21I also include spending identified as “other” in the accounts, since loans from tramways and electric
lighting were not distinguished for non-incorporated towns, or for any towns before 1900.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has tested the relationship between democratic reform and government expen-
diture on public goods in the context of nineteenth-century England. The results indicate
that extensions of political rights to the poor inhibited the expansion of local governments
into new types of expenditure. Rather, the expansion of government was driven by councils
where elites consisted predominantly of middle-class households.
These findings support a different explanation for the growth of government into the
provision of new services. Rather than a response to the demands for redistribution to the
masses, the state instead responded to the demands of a newly industrialized middle class
that was sufficiently wealthy to desire public goods that only the government could provide.
The poor, on the other hand, did not want the same public goods since they would rather
spend the same income on private consumption, such as food. Then government grew when
there was “enough” democracy such that those sufficiently wealthy to desire public goods
had control of public expenditure.
The crucial component of this argument is that the poor have to pay for their public
goods through taxation. In the context of this paper all heads of household were liable
for taxation. In the longer run though, perhaps the poor can demand tax systems that
could reallocate this cost towards those most willing to pay. In the twentieth century, tax
systems did become increasingly progressive (Scheve and Stasavage, 2012). Yet in practice
all citizens continue to pay taxes; most countries impose Value Added Tax (VAT) or other
consumption taxes at a national level imposing costs on even the poorest citizens (Keen,
2009). In developing economies that require the types of public goods studied in this paper—
such as water supply and sanitation—charging even the poorest users is often argued to be
necessary to ensure sustainability of investments (OECD, 2009; African Development Bank,
2010). Understanding the extent to which these tax structures inhibit valuable government
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infrastructure investments is a subject for future research.
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A Historical background
A.1 Devolution of powers to local government
Parliament reacted to the growing sanitary movement in the 1840s by emphasizing the
role of local action in combating insanitary conditions. Rather than taking direct action
to improve sanitary environments, the national government “began a series of legislative
measures in which the state became guarantor of standards of health and environmental
quality and provided means for local units of government to make the structural changes to
meet those standards” (Hamlin and Sheard, 1998, p.587). As a result the nineteenth-century
saw a gradual broadening of both local governments’ powers and their responsibility for the
maintenance of their local environment.
The process of devolution began with the 1848 Public Health Act, which established
the principle of “localism” in sanitary affairs by offering local taxpayers (“ratepayers”) the
opportunity to establish a local board of health with both the responsibility for sewers and
street cleaning, and the power to ensure a satisfactory water supply.22 This provided towns
with a low cost mechanism through which councils could gain the authority to invest in
sanitary improvements. Before 1848 such powers were obtainable only on a case by case
basis through private acts of Parliament (“Improvement Acts”), which often imposed a
prohibitive cost on smaller and poorer towns (Wilson, 1997). But the 1848 Act was not
enough to stimulate investment since many towns did very little even if they obtained the
power to do so. Faced with this lack of response, Parliament imposed greater mandatory
responsibilities on town councils. The Public Health Acts of 1872 and 1875 established a
network of urban and rural sanitary authorities covering the entire country, tasked with the
responsibility to ensure the provision of sanitary services in their jurisdiction.
22The 1848 Public Health Act was extended by the 1858 Local Government Act, and many authorities
acquired their powers under the latter legislation. I refer to both as the 1848 Act for simplicity.
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A.2 Government grants
Councils received some additional revenue from central government grants during this period.
However, the grants were limited to those services deemed “national” in character, such as
policing and the maintenance of “lunatics”.23 Further, grants remained small compared
to the size of town revenue, with many towns receiving nothing at all and few receiving an
amount exceeding 5% of their rate revenue. As a result, the economic literature has generally
seen grants as having a limited role in the expansion of local government.24
However, there were some important changes in the grant system after 1890 that may
have received too little focus in the existing literature.25 In 1890 new county councils,
created by the 1888 Local Government Act, gained responsibility for maintaining “main
roads” within their jurisdiction. As a result these new county councils had to bear some
of the cost of maintenance and repair of roads within their district, necessitating transfers
to town councils within their area. The size of these transfers, while not huge, were much
larger than other forms of external revenue. Once transfers from the counties is included, the
median town received grants worth more than 20% of their rate revenue in 1895, of which
by far the largest component related to funding of roads. These grants amounted to 40% of
the median town’s expenditure on roads.26
These transfers were funded largely by sources outside of each individual town, through
either a county-wide tax or funding from central government. As such, these grants allowed
spending on roads to be funded from a wider tax base than the town’s own property. How-
ever, often this funding was essentially conditional on towns also spending their own tax
revenue: they would often access this funding through cost-sharing agreements where, for
23For further discussion of the rationale and use of central government grants during this period see the
Final Report of the Royal Commission on Local Taxation, 1901 [Cd. 638]XXIV.413.
24See Millward and Sheard (1995), for instance, who group central government grants along with all other
“non-trading” income.
25See however the discussion in Waller (1983).
26These figures exclude the “county boroughs” which acted as independent counties and so did not receive
these transfers.
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instance, the County Council would agree to fund a fixed amount of maintenance cost per
year for a fixed term. Alternatively, towns could seek to broaden the scope of the funding
they received by petitioning for more roads to be recognized as “main roads”.
The measure included in the regression tables includes transfers for all purposes from
both county councils and central government.
A.3 Types of spending
Figure V displays the breakdown of current spending in incorporated and unincorporated
towns in 1884 and 1903. The main difference between the two is that some incorporated
towns had responsibility for the provision of police, prosecutions and maintaining prisoners
in their jurisdictions.27 Similarly, the category of “other” spending is higher in incorporated
towns, reflecting the fact that they held certain responsibilities not held by non-incorporated
towns (such as the maintenance of “lunatic” asylums, for instance). Expenditure on streets—
including repairs, maintenance, and street cleaning (scavenging) is the main single item of
expenditure in both groups of towns, followed by loan service (including both principal and
interest repayment).
B Descriptive statistics and additional results
B.1 Descriptive statistics
Table IX summarizes the main variables used in the regressions.
27Unincorporated towns did have some spending on police, but the amounts are very small and so are not
split out in the accounts.
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Figure V: Similar pattern of spending between incorporated and
unincorporated towns, except that some incorporated towns had more
responsibility for spending on police and prosecutions.
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Figure includes expenditure not out of loans in sample of towns identified by the matching
exercise. “Other public goods” includes (amongst other items) public lighting, electricity
supply, tramways, hospitals, parks and open spaces, baths and wash-houses, collection and
destruction of house refuse, fire brigades, housing, public offices and buildings, markets, and
libraries . “Loan service” includes interest payments and repayment of principal”. “Justice
system” includes payment to police, payments to police pension funds, and prosecutions.
“Other” includes technical and intermediate education, private improvement works, salaries
not reported elsewhere, transfers to other local authorities, contributions to school boards
and similar bodies, lunatics and lunatic asylums, maintenance of prisoners, and transfers to
other funds.
B.2 Alternative specifications for change in expenditure
Table X–Table XIII present the results of alternative specifications testing the effect of the
1894 reforms. Table IV. tests for a level change in expenditure per capita (rather than
the change in time trend in the main analysis), reflecting the more standard “difference-in-
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Table IX: Descriptive statistics of main variables.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Current spending per capita (£p.c.) 8794 .77 .47 .07 4.42
Tax base per capita (£p.c.) 8794 3.46 1.35 .8 30.96
Property receipts (£p.c.) 8794 .03 .14 0 11.58
Grant receipts (£p.c.) 8794 .09 .1 0 2.39
Population (10,000s) 8794 .7 .45 .07 3.13
Population growth (%) 8794 .9 1.48 -3.99 13.07
Population/number of houses 7913 4.92 .63 3.6 10.85
% Population density 1306 5.88 8.64 .11 182.19
% Workforce in textiles 8794 10.56 17.68 .15 64.12
% Workforce in agriculture 8794 13.26 10.15 .45 57.17
% Workforce in minerals 8794 14.29 16.2 1.56 69.19
% Workforce white collar 8794 5.29 2.36 1.47 18.38
% foreign born 8794 2.06 1.88 .15 16.91
Note: Includes only towns included in the matched sample and hence
in the regression estimations. Data is only available in census years for
1891 and 1901 for population density and for years before 1901 for urban
crowding; in missing years the previous available value is used.
difference” approach. Table XI builds on these specifications, but with the inclusion of a
lagged dependent variable. Table XII uses the change in the annual expenditure per capita
as the dependent variable. Finally Table XIII repeats this approach but with the inclusion
of the lagged level of spending, to account for the fact that the growth in expenditure is
likely to be affected by the level of infrastructure a town already has. In all specifications
I control for year fixed effects. In each of the tables, between column (1) and column (6)
I change the set of control variables and the sample in the same way as in the comparable
table in the main text (Table X).
The results show consistent support for the fact that the reforms slowed the growth in
expenditure. In Table X all the coefficients on the Unincorporated*post1894 are negative, but
are only statistically significant in 2 of the 6 specifications. Once the level of lag spending
is included however (Table XI), there is strong evidence that the level of expenditure in
unincorporated towns was lower after the 1894 reform.
Table XII directly tests whether there was a reduction in the change in the level of
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expenditure after the reforms. Again, the coefficients are negative and statistically significant
at the 5% level in all 6 specifications. Table XIII shows that these results are robust to
controlling for the level of spending in the previous period.
Table X: Testing for a level change in expenditure leads to negative coefficients
but not always statistically significant.
DV = Current expenditure p.c.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unincorporated -0.597*** -0.633*** -0.385*** -0.297***
(0.070) (0.074) (0.072) (0.073)
Unincorporated*post1894 -0.079 -0.083 -0.085* -0.079 -0.079 -0.095**
(0.051) (0.053) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.046)
post1894 0.738*** 0.753*** 0.553*** 0.568*** 0.661*** 0.679***
(0.051) (0.056) (0.053) (0.053) (0.050) (0.048)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Pop controls N Y Y Y Y Y
Occ controls N N N Y N N
Wealth controls N N Y Y Y Y
Town FE N N N N Y Y
Obs. 8794 8794 8794 8794 8794 6158
Rsq 0.22 0.27 0.47 0.49 0.51 0.46
Years All All All All All > 1889
The effect of democratic reform is identified by the interaction between unincorporated and the
post 1894 dummy variable. The dummy variable for being unincorporated is absorbed by town
fixed effects in specifications (5) and (6). “Population controls” include (in quantile bins) popula-
tion, urban crowding, population growth, and population density. “Occupation controls” include
(in quantile bins) the percentage of 1881 workforce in textiles, minerals, agriculture, service and
commercial/professional, as well as the proportion of the population foreign born. “Wealth con-
trols” include per capita rateable value, central government grants and property revenue. Stan-
dard errors are clustered by town and displayed in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
B.3 Alternative definitions of middle-class towns
I present two robustness checks to the definition of middle-class power. First, I define the
share of middle-class power based on the share of the total number of servants in households
with only one servant. Second, I define middle class as having one or two servants. The
results, displayed in Table XIV and Table XV respectively, are very similar to those in the
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Table XI: There is evidence of a negative level effect on spending once lagged
expenditure is controlled for.
DV = Current expenditure p.c.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unincorporated -0.021** -0.026*** -0.016 -0.008
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
Unincorporated*post1894 -0.023** -0.023** -0.023* -0.023* -0.037* -0.051**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.021) (0.023)
Lag spend p.c. 0.971*** 0.967*** 0.933*** 0.930*** 0.662*** 0.610***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.037) (0.043)
post1894 0.063*** 0.066*** 0.065*** 0.067*** 0.239*** 0.279***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.036) (0.039)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Pop controls N Y Y Y Y Y
Occ controls N N N Y Y Y
Wealth controls N N Y Y Y Y
Town FE N N N N Y Y
Obs. 8337 8337 8337 8337 8337 6143
Rsq 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.71 0.65
Years All All All All All > 1889
The effect of democratic reform is identified by the interaction between unincorporated and the
post 1894 dummy variable. The dummy variable for being unincorporated is absorbed by town
fixed effects in specifications (5) and (6). “Population controls” include (in quantile bins) popula-
tion, urban crowding, population growth, and population density. “Occupation controls” include
(in quantile bins) the percentage of 1881 workforce in textiles, minerals, agriculture, service and
commercial/professional, as well as the proportion of the population foreign born. “Wealth con-
trols” include changes in per capita rateable value, central government grants and property rev-
enue. Standard errors are clustered by town and displayed in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
main text.
B.4 Adjusting expenditure for changes in the price index
Adjusting for price changes is complicated by the fact that, as shown in Figure VI, prices
fluctuated significantly on a year to year basis during this time period. In some years prices
are reported to have changed by over 10% within a single year. As a result, while the
series for nominal average expenditure per capita is quite smooth, the series for real average
expenditure per capita is much more volatile. It seems unlikely that the actual output of
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Table XII: Using the change in the spending as the dependent variable leads to
similar results as in the main regressions.
DV = ∆ Current expenditure p.c.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unincorporated -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Unincorporated*Post1894 -0.022** -0.021** -0.025** -0.025** -0.025** -0.029**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
∆ tax base p.c. 0.014 0.014 0.012 0.013
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020)
∆ property receipts p.c. 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.005*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
∆ Transfers p.c. 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.095*** 0.088***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
post1894 0.043* 0.042* 0.046** 0.045** 0.047** 0.047**
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Pop controls N Y Y Y Y Y
Occ controls N N N Y N N
Town FE N N N N Y Y
Obs. 8337 8337 8337 8337 8337 6143
Rsq 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
Years All All All All All > 1889
The effect of democratic reform is identified by the interaction between unincorporated and the
post 1894 dummy variable. The dummy variable for being unincorporated is absorbed by town
fixed effects in specifications (5) and (6). “Population controls” include (in quantile bins) popula-
tion, urban crowding, population growth, and population density. “Occupation controls” include
(in quantile bins) the percentage of 1881 workforce in textiles, minerals, agriculture, service and
commercial/professional, as well as the proportion of the population foreign born. “Wealth con-
trols” include changes in per capita rateable value, central government grants and property rev-
enue. Standard errors are clustered by town and displayed in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
government goods and services would fluctuate to this extent. Further, some elements of
spending—notably debt servicing and to an extent labor costs would not be subject to these
price changes.
Adjusting the financial variables weakens the results, as shown in Table XVI and Ta-
ble XVII. This is as expected given that the volatility of the price series is adding noise to
the estimation of the time trend. In particular, the estimated coefficient is no longer statisti-
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Table XIII: Significant evidence of a reduction in the change in expenditure
per capita remains after controlling for the lagged level of spending.
DV = ∆ Current expenditure p.c.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unincorporated -0.021** -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.014
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Unincorporated*Post1894 -0.023** -0.023** -0.027** -0.027** -0.043** -0.051**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.020) (0.021)
∆ tax base p.c. 0.015 0.014 0.011 0.010
(0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017)
∆ property receipts p.c. 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
∆ Transfers p.c. 0.097*** 0.096*** 0.083*** 0.074***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019)
post1894 0.063*** 0.066*** 0.069*** 0.075*** 0.251*** 0.290***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.035) (0.038)
Lag spending p.c. -0.029*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.043*** -0.289*** -0.347***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.034) (0.041)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Pop controls N Y Y Y Y Y
Occ controls N N N Y N N
Town FE N N N N Y Y
Obs. 8337 8337 8337 8337 8337 6143
Rsq 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.17 0.19
Years All All All All All > 1889
The effect of democratic reform is identified by the interaction between unincorporated and the
post 1894 dummy variable. The dummy variable for being unincorporated is absorbed by town
fixed effects in specifications (5) and (6). “Population controls” include (in quantile bins) popula-
tion, urban crowding, population growth, and population density. “Occupation controls” include
(in quantile bins) the percentage of 1881 workforce in textiles, minerals, agriculture, service and
commercial/professional, as well as the proportion of the population foreign born. “Wealth con-
trols” include changes in per capita rateable value, central government grants and property rev-
enue. Standard errors are clustered by town and displayed in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
cally significant across all towns when either the wealth controls are excluded (specifications
(1) and (2)) or town fixed effects are included. However, we examine the effect only in
middle-class controlled towns, the estimated effect remains strongly statistically significant
(although smaller than in the main specifications).
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Table XIV: Similar results using measure of middle-class control based on
share of total servants in households with 1 servants relative to households
with more than one servant.
Upper-class dominated Middle-class dominated
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unincorporated -0.404*** -0.201** -0.715*** -0.251*
(0.109) (0.095) (0.120) (0.129)
Time 0.032*** 0.002 0.014*** 0.025*** -0.001 0.014*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007)
Time*Unincorporated 0.005 0.018*** 0.011* 0.003 0.013 0.004
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Time*Post1894 0.049*** 0.069*** 0.061*** 0.101*** 0.116*** 0.106***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Time*Unincorporated*Post1894 0.004 -0.029** -0.016 -0.065*** -0.081*** -0.065***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014)
Year FE N N N N N N
Population controls N Y Y N Y Y
Occupation controls N Y N N Y N
Wealth controls N Y Y N Y Y
Town FE N N Y N N Y
Obs. 4411 4411 4411 4383 4383 4383
Rsq 0.17 0.47 0.51 0.30 0.53 0.56
“Population controls” include (in quantile bins) population, urban crowding, population growth, and popu-
lation density. “Occupation controls” include (in quantile bins) the percentage of 1881 workforce in textiles,
minerals, agriculture, service and commercial/professional, as well as the proportion of the population foreign
born. “Wealth controls” include per capita rateable value, central government grants and property revenue.
Standard errors are clustered by town and displayed in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table XV: Similar results when defining middle-class households as those with
either 1 or 2 servants.
Upper-class dominated Middle-class dominated
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unincorporated -0.491*** -0.201* -0.661*** -0.225**
(0.120) (0.109) (0.104) (0.111)
Time 0.038*** 0.010* 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.001 0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Time*Unincorporated -0.004 0.006 0.000 0.011 0.016** 0.012**
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006)
Time*Post1894 0.046*** 0.067*** 0.057*** 0.090*** 0.095*** 0.093***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012)
Time*Unincorporated*Post1894 0.004 -0.024* -0.008 -0.053*** -0.066*** -0.056***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013)
Year FE N N N N N N
Population controls N Y Y N Y Y
Occupation controls N Y N N Y N
Wealth controls N Y Y N Y Y
Town FE N N Y N N Y
Obs. 4412 4412 4412 4382 4382 4382
Rsq 0.19 0.50 0.54 0.28 0.53 0.51
“Population controls” include (in quantile bins) population, urban crowding, population growth, and popu-
lation density. “Occupation controls” include (in quantile bins) the percentage of 1881 workforce in textiles,
minerals, agriculture, service and commercial/professional, as well as the proportion of the population foreign
born. “Wealth controls” include per capita rateable value, central government grants and property revenue.
Standard errors are clustered by town and displayed in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Figure VI: Adjusting for price changes leads to volatility in expenditure per
capita time series.
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Government Act.
56
Table XVI: Estimated effect of democratic reform on growth in spending
remains but is weaker once the financial variables have been converted into real
terms.
DV = Current expenditure p.c. (standardized)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unincorporated -0.629*** -0.667*** -0.328*** -0.252***
(0.086) (0.086) (0.085) (0.085)
Time 0.065*** 0.064*** 0.012** 0.017*** 0.034*** 0.034***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Time*Unincorporated -0.009 -0.008 0.008 0.006 -0.001 -0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Time*Post1894 -0.004 -0.002 0.060*** 0.052*** 0.033*** 0.033***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Time*Unincorporated*Post1894 -0.001 -0.003 -0.037*** -0.032*** -0.019* -0.019*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Pop controls N Y Y Y Y Y
Occ controls N N N Y N N
Wealth controls N N Y Y Y Y
Town FE N N N N Y Y
Obs. 8794 8794 8794 8794 8794 8794
Rsq 0.22 0.27 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.52
Years All All All All All > 1889
The effect of democratic reform is identified by the interaction between unincorporated, time and the
post 1894 dummy variable. “Population controls” include (in quantile bins) population, urban crowding,
population growth, and population density. “Occupation controls” include (in quantile bins) the per-
centage of 1881 workforce in textiles, minerals, agriculture, service and commercial/professional, as well
as the proportion of the population foreign born. “Wealth controls” include per capita rateable value,
central government grants and property revenue. Standard errors are clustered by town and displayed in
parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table XVII: Estimated effect of democratic reform on growth in spending
remains strong in middle-class towns once the financial variables have been
converted into real terms.
Upper-class dominated Middle-class dominated
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unincorporated -0.476*** -0.265*** -0.692*** -0.193
(0.121) (0.100) (0.122) (0.136)
Time 0.068*** 0.012* 0.029*** 0.059*** 0.020* 0.036***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Time*Unincorporated -0.003 0.011 0.004 -0.009 0.005 -0.004
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Time*Post1894 -0.021** 0.048*** 0.031*** 0.026* 0.069*** 0.053***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Time*Unincorporated*Post1894 0.019 -0.021 -0.006 -0.035** -0.057*** -0.045***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014)
Population controls N Y Y N Y Y
Occupation controls N Y N N Y N
Wealth controls N Y Y N Y Y
Town FE N N Y N N Y
Obs. 4392 4392 4392 4402 4402 4402
Rsq 0.18 0.49 0.54 0.28 0.51 0.55
“Population controls” include (in quantile bins) population, urban crowding, population growth, and popu-
lation density. “Occupation controls” include (in quantile bins) the percentage of 1881 workforce in textiles,
minerals, agriculture, service and commercial/professional, as well as the proportion of the population foreign
born. “Wealth controls” include per capita rateable value, central government grants and property revenue.
Standard errors are clustered by town and displayed in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
58
